The right to strike has been largely acknowledged as an indispensable element of collective bargaining, and as one of the most essential means by which workers can preserve their socio-economic rights.
scholarly literature and reflection regarding the level of protection that has being afforded to the right to strike.
This article seeks to examine, from a human rights perspective, the degree of protection of the right to strike under article 11 ECHR. Section B will assess whether article 11 ECHR offers any possibility for reading into its provisions a general right to strike. It will scrutinise the initial reluctance of the ECtHR to proceed to such an interpretation, and thus to adequately safeguard the right at issue. Section C will discuss the problematic background from which the Demir and Baykara judgment emerged while considering the case's impact on the protection of the right to strike. Section D will critically examine the decision in RMT v UK, in which the ECtHR appeared to displace any optimism its previous jurisprudence had generated. It will focus on the UK's problematic pre-industrial notices which are necessary for striking workers to escape tortious liability, and on the Court's classification of secondary action as an 'accessory', rather than a core aspect of trade unions' activity. Section E discusses the importance of the right to strike as a human right. It will be argued that its enhanced protection can result in the promotion of human rights for both those taking part in the industrial action and those who are not formally engaged in the dispute. Finally, it will discuss why the ECHR constitutes the 'safest' route through which individuals and trade unions can challenge breaches vis-à-vis the right to strike.
B. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE ECHR: THE COURT'S INITIAL RELUCTANCE
It is true that until relatively recently the ECHR was thought to constitute an instrument for ensuring civil and political entitlements. In the course of adopting its human rights instruments, the Council of Europe drew an apparent distinction between civil and political rights enshrined in the ECHR on the one hand and the socio-economic rights contained in the European Social Charter ('ESC') on the other. Hence, as a socio-economic right, the ECHR does not recognize in any specific way the right to bargain collectively, let alone the right to strike.
As Dorssemont points out, by virtue of this absence, the only prospect for judicial recognition of a right to strike derives from article 11 ECHR, which guarantees the freedom of association in a rather openly-worded form.
14 This article provides that 'the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others' includes 'the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of their interests'. 15 Dorssemont argues that this approach -a generic recognition -essentially differs from the method in which the right to organise is construed in more specialised international instruments. 16 Within such instruments this right is fleshed out as an entitlement that stems from the freedom of association. 17 For instance, under the ESC, the right to collective action is interpreted as intertwined with the right to collectively bargain, 18 while its provision on the freedom of association is silent with regard to collective action/strike. 19 Having said that and bearing in mind both the non-existence of any stand-alone acknowledgment of a right to strike and the presence of a specific right to form and join a trade union, the question that naturally arises is whether article 11 offers the legal space for reading into its provisions 'a number of corollary rights regarded as inherent aspects of the more generic freedom of association '. 20 Dorssemont, in considering the wording of the aforementioned provisions, admits that the possibilities for such an evolution are limited. 21 He stresses that the 'right to form and join a trade union' purely rephrases the key principles of the freedom of association and for that reason the scope of article 11 appears to be construed in a way that covers only the individual, rather than the collective dimension of the right to organise. 22 This narrow approach generates several concerns in relation to the protection of trade unions' interests, and more specifically to the exercise of the right to collective action.
Fortunately for the protection of human rights, at least within the context of the ECHR, the mere phrasing of a provision does not reveal the whole spectrum of the protection afforded under a particular right. Therefore, in order to assess the status of the right to strike under the ECHR, a thorough examination of the ECtHR's jurisprudence is essential.
The Court's restrictive approach towards the interpretation of article 11 ECHR
As mentioned above the ECHR has, since its inception, been seen as an instrument for ensuring primarily civil and political rights. Even though the official position of the Council The Court in a number of cases during the 1970s adopted a rather restrictive interpretation, by merely emphasizing that article 11 imposes a duty on contracting states to provide mechanisms that allow trade unions to represent their members; it did not make any particular reference to the methods by which this was to be done. 25 Consequently, the Court ruled against trade unions which sought to guarantee their interests vis-à-vis the rights to consultation, collective bargaining and strike. 26 Hendy and Ewing argue that this reluctance can in part be attributed to the existence of the ESC, in relation to which states parties are able to choose freely the specific provisions that they are prepared to accept. 27 In the early case of National Union of Belgian Police, 28 it was held that article 6(1) ESC cannot be construed in a manner that gives rise to a 'real right to consultation' and that, even if it did so, this did not mean that article 11 ECHR should be interpreted as such. 29 The Court relied on the traditional dichotomy between civil liberties and socio-economic rights. 30 As Novitz rightly points out, it seems doubtful that the drafters of the ESC envisaged that the mechanism would not strengthen the protection of trade unions' interests; rather, it would offer the ECtHR a good reason to construe article 11 in a more protective way. 31 For instance,
The ECtHR had the chance to trace a link between the freedom of association and the right to collectively bargain but did not engage in such considerations.
The approach in National Union of Belgian Police proved to be damaging for trade unions in the process of challenging limitations on the exercise of the right to strike which did not infringe the equal treatment principle. This became apparent in the subsequent case of tried to challenge the lawfulness of restrictions on the right to strike under article 11 ECHR.
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It was held that the right to strike was one of the most important methods by which workers can protect their interests. It went on, however, to add that such a right was by no means the only avenue to do so; there were other ways for the applicants to equally defend their occupational rights. 33 Plainly, the Court not only treated the right to strike as an important, rather than an essential 'tool' in the hands of workers, but also failed to interpret it as an entitlement 'expressly enshrined in Article 11'. 34 What is surprising with this particular case is that the decision was concluded with reference to the principles protected under both the ILO and the ESC. In addition, the ECtHR's argument relating to alternatives to the right to strike is also open to doubt. Industrial actions are meant to be detrimental for every employer.
As Davies states, 'the more harm they cause, the more efficacious they are expected to be in convincing the employer to make concessions'. 35 Thus, alternative means might not be as effective as the act of striking.
Overall, the Court's 'guarded language' 36 in its early jurisprudence regarding article 11 constituted an impenetrable barrier for trade unions and individual workers to assert their work-related interests under the Convention. The reluctance of the Court to recognize the importance of the right for the enjoyment of freedom of association appeared to come into contrast with the principles enshrined in other international instruments, like the ESC.
Thankfully, cases such as Schmidt and Dahlström appear to have been isolated setbacks and have not been prohibitive with regard to ensuring a more effective protection of collective rights collective rights derived from the ECHR.
Demir and Baykara v Turkey:
The 'U-Turn' in the court's jurisprudence As Ewing noted, the Court's early case-law with respect to the right to strike meant that few could have foreseen the complainant's success in Demir and Baykara. 37 But already in 2002
the Court seemed to adopt a considerably divergent approach in UNISON. 38 There, it was acknowledged for the first time -even though the Court reiterated the mantra that recourse to strike action was simply an important, rather than an essential means to preserve worker's rights -that any constraint on the right to strike 'must be regarded as a restriction on the Let us contend that such disputes within the most specialised-authoritative UN institution concerning labour rights could also have a negative effect as far as the relevant jurisprudence of the ECtHR is concerned. This occurs because the Court's dynamic interpretation is and will continue to be based upon the status of the right to strike within the ILO Convention. 86 Accordingly, the absence of consensus concerning the scope of the latter's protection could also call into question the legal basis of the ECtHR's interpretation and in turn its own credibility as a human rights court. As such, it could be assumed that the Court's reluctance to qualify the right to strike as 'essential' for the purposes of article 11 ECHR can be, amongst other reasons, attributed to the internal disputes within its main authoritative source with regard to labour entitlements. Detrimental consequences for the protection of the right to strike materialized from these concerns in the recent case of RMT v UK, 87 where the Court seemed to temper its position on the preservation of the right to collective action. 
D. THE CASE OF RMT V UNITED KINGDOM: THE 'HANGOVER' OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
Hangovers and blackouts can reduce the ability of the brain to form long-term memories. The causes are more or less well-known and no further explanation is needed. It would be fair to ask how the word 'hangover' relates to the ECtHR and its jurisprudence. Professor Ewing employed this word, likening the ruling of the RMT case to a person that experiences the effects of 'hangover'. 88 He explained that the Court seemed to have partially forgotten its previous promising jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court in RMT appeared 'to misplace the optimism' the cases of Demir and Enerji generated, 89 in a highly problematic judgement regarding the protection of the right to collective action.
The case involved two specific issues, namely the complex balloting provisions trade unions have to comply with before a strike action takes place, and the blanket ban of secondary or solidarity strike actions. Before examining this case in more depth, some information with respect to the status of the right to strike in the UK is useful. In the UK there has never existed any positive right to strike or other similar actions, and any such act has always been potentially unlawful at common law, under one or other of the 'economic torts', like conspiracy or inducement to breach a contract. 90 In other words, as Maurice Kay LJ emphasized, this right in the UK 'has never been more than a slogan or a legal metaphor.
What has happened is that … legislation has provided limited immunities from a liability in tort'. 91 Consequently, industrial action might be restricted by an injunction brought by the employer, who may also be able to claim damages for their losses. article 11 ECHR, the decision reduced the scope of its protection. 93 As stated, the case concerned two specific complaints. In relation to the pre-industrial notices that are necessary in escaping tortious liability, RMT members sought to challenge the granting of an injunction to inhibit their union from calling industrial action. At issue was the trade union's failure to act in accordance with the ballot notice provisions, which required the union to give to the employer sufficiently detailed information on the groups of those workers expected to participate in the strike action. This failure resulted in the employer being awarded an injunction permitting him to restrict the strike action. The union corrected its initial mistake and after re-balloting it gave to the employer its renewed notice. It is contended that the Court's attitude in this regard was problematic for various reasons. First, as a matter of fact, the effects of the injunction were detrimental in the sense that the union incurred costs of £87,000 to defend its actions in domestic courts. 98 It had also suffered a considerable delay while the re-balloting procedure took place, depriving the union of its initial tactical advantage. 99 Secondly, as a matter of law, the Court's 'poor' explanation appeared to come into contrast with its previous jurisprudence on the restrictions on the right to strike. It is recalled that in the earlier case of Kaya and Seyhan a disciplinary warning to two secondary school teachers was considered as discouraging the applicants from engaging in a one day strike action; hence, it was not justified under the restrictions of article 11(2) upon the trade union were not deemed sufficient to trigger the applicability of article 11(1).
As Ewing and Bogg argue, it is difficult to understand how 'the labyrinthine notice provisions conditioning the legality of strike action in the UK, along with the costs and the practical disadvantages followed due to the injunction, did not constitute an impediment discouraging the union's ability to safeguard its members' interests'. 101 It is indeed peculiar that a disciplinary warning in Kaya and Seyhan had not been justified under article 11(2), whilst the restrictions at issue could not fall within article 11(1). It will not come as a surprise therefore that the Court, once again, avoided qualifying the right to strike as an essential To begin with the 'labour-friendly' aspect of the case, the ECtHR acknowledged the existence of an implicit right to secondary action which is preserved under the ambit of article 11. In coming to this conclusion, the Court referred to other international instruments and the decisions of international supervisory bodies, as well as common practices of the ECHR's states parties. For instance, both the provisions of the ILO and ESC enshrine this right as part of the wider right to strike. 104 But the Court classified it as an 'accessory' rather a core feature of trade unions' right to associate thereby reducing the level of protection afforded to it. 105 A wider margin of appreciation was given to the UK in the determination of the issue under article 11(2). The UK authorities stressed that solidarity strikes should be strictly limited, because they could potentially damage the economic recovery of the country by disrupting its economic process. 106 In seeking to justify this, the UK also cited statistics in relation to the negative financial impacts the strike caused, but it did not proceed to any division between primary and secondary action. Barrow argues that the information given by the government was highly unconvincing since there was no proof that the consequences of the action in question were so detrimental for third parties and the economy as a whole. The
Court accepted these arguments and found that the blanket prohibition of secondary actions was proportionate and necessary in a democratic society in pursuing the legitimate aim of preserving the rights and freedoms of others not engaging in the dispute. In other words:
although the UK's blanket ban on secondary action was a very restrictive measure compared with the position in other parties of the Convention, that it did not by itself indicate that in regulating this aspect of trade union activity it had inevitably exceeded its wide margin of appreciation. 107 Thus, this interference did not violate the right to strike.
It is surprising that the ECtHR accepted the UK's arguments and upheld a wide margin of appreciation. It did not examine the costs that a blanket prohibition could have on the trade unions' legitimate activity to protect the interests of their members, especially when they are participating in industrial action and supplementary pressure is a useful bargaining tool. In doing so, as Barrow mentions, the Court disposed of two key factors that have played a prominent role in its previous jurisprudence: the conformity of the measure with European labour standards and the principles deriving from related international instruments. 108 It argued that the assessment of the legal matters was particular to the circumstances of the case; the supervisory bodies' approach regarding the ban on secondary action was not persuasive, as the issue was examined only in exceptional situations. 109 It was held that the ILO's jurisprudence was limited to situations where the ban of solidarity actions was deemed to make it easier for the employers to take advantage of the law in question. 110 This could occur 'where there is a very high degree of proximity between a "primary" and a "secondary"
employer (for example, by outsourcing work to another enterprise)'. 111 According to the Court this scenario did not apply to the very facts of RMT; Hydrex Enterprise Ltd and Jarvis
Ltd were genuinely distinct entities and as such there was no 'abuse' of powers on the employer's part.
Bogg and Ewing characterised these findings as 'unsupportable', due to the Court's restrictive interpretation. 112 They argued that the ILO's supervisory bodies have also espoused a broader approach regarding the protection of solidarity action by highlighting its importance in situations where it has been used to assist foreign workers to secure their entitlements, or in supporting multi-employer collective bargaining. 113 Thus, it could be stated that the Court adopted a 'pick and choose' stance, by construing the ILO's jurisprudence in a rather restrictive manner. Such behaviour comes into contrast to the approach adopted in Demir and Enerji where the principles enshrined in international supervisory bodies had been construed in an expansive way based on their systematic breakdown. At this point, Ewing's 'hangover' characterization is relevant. The Court seemed to forget its labour-friendly approach and, in 'light of the breadth of the margin of appreciation in this area', 114 it paid lip service to the principles and jurisprudence of specialised institutions.
Yet, this was not the only problem as far as the ruling is concerned. As seen, the Court has classified secondary action as an 'accessory' rather than a core aspect of trade unions' activities. It is true that this distinction resembles to a certain extent the division that has been drawn with respect to the primary right to strike within the Convention, ie it is an important, rather than essential feature of article 11 ECHR. Having already expressed a view on the latter distinction, it is arguable that the legal implications for characterising secondary action Much of the discussion regarding the protection of the right to strike has been concentrated on its impact on workers' interests. It is undeniably an essential facet of the right to freedom of association, as without it the right to collective bargaining would be a rather 'weak' process, where the employer would have the upper hand in determining the working rules and conditions. Its primary function is the promotion of social and political entitlements enshrined in international human rights law. This for instance includes the right to decent remuneration; strike action can also be carried out to ensure that their right to safe and healthy working conditions is respected.
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AS
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Still, the impact of industrial actions is not confined to situations where purely labour interests are at stake. As Ewing states, many of the significant right to strike cases in domestic courts are identified as human rights cases, even though they are not articulated as such. 124 Notably, in some of these cases the right to strike was brought to the fore as the means of giving effect to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. For example, this has become apparent in instances where the right to freedom of conscience was involved (by rejecting the idea to undertake obligations that offend the worker's conscious beliefs), 125 and practices fail to fulfil these duties, 'it is hard to deny that a strike to increase the standards of some workers to these international minimum prerequisites is an industrial action designed to promote and establish human rights'. 127 In the absence of any legislative obligation imposed on the employer, strike action might be the only resort for individuals and trade unions to safeguard the human rights that their government failed to enforce, despite its international obligations. 128 This underlines the importance of qualifying the right to strike as a human right.
Finally, the importance of the right to strike can be illustrated through a third perspective, which is equally important. Particularly, the effects of a strike action can be expanded to human rights holders who are not taking part in the action in question, ie to third parties. This can occur where one group of workers may go on strike in an attempt to secure the reinstatement of workers fired due to their trade union activity; or where a trade union may boycott a specific place of work because it discriminates between domestic and migrant workers. In both situations the element of solidarity is essential for the promotion of human rights. Thus, both primary and secondary strike actions play a vital role in the comprehensive protection of the right to strike.
To summarise, in view of the significance of the right to strike, it could be stated that its adequate protection could have as a result not only the protection of those formally engaged in the dispute but also the preservation of the rights and freedoms of others. The question that then arises is whether the ECtHR can rely on the legacy of Demir and Enerji to adequately protect such rights, or whether the most recent developments of RMT case render these expectations impossible? What began as a meltdown of the global financial system during the period of 2007-08 has now taken the form of a new economic and political reality of austerity policies, which according to many commentators jeopardizes the enjoyment of human rights generally, and socio-economic rights in particular. 129 Indeed, since 2010, austerity has become the 'only game in town'. 130 The present-day attention is on new economic governance activities and the subjection of labour rights in general to more closely coordinated national economic arrangements. The latter have been presented as part of the Europe 2020 growth strategy, with the scrutiny and surveillance of national economies. 131 Perhaps the greatest impact of these measures is the coordinated attack on collective bargaining structures and as an immediate result on strike actions. For instance, the levels of strike activity in the UK in recent years have fallen to their lowest for over a century; 132 in Finland, after the crisis was declared, the number of illegal strikes has soared; 133 while in Greece the recent Law 3899/2010creates a number of additional requirements regarding industrial actions that can only be met by trade unions with great difficulty. 134 Although a full account of the consequence of the financial crisis on the right to strike is beyond the scope of this article, it can be stated that the plethora of measures adopted by the majority of European states poses a real threat to the enjoyment of workers' entitlements and consequently to the right to strike.
Apart from the detrimental effects of the 'great recession' on industrial actions, the treatment of the right to strike by the EU has also been problematic and contested. As Novitz argues, within the EU 'the trend has been towards not positive protection, but rather the exercise of EU powers to negate access to strike actions.' 135 the Court of Justice ('CJEU') held that such a right could and needed to be balanced against the commercial principles of the European economic institution. Consequently, the right to strike was constrained in a manner unprecedented in the domestic constitutional orders. By applying a proportionality test which asked whether the economic freedoms enshrined in EU law could be justifiably limited by the right to strike, the CJEU seemed to be prioritising economic freedoms over fundamental rights. 139 Thus, where collective actions are at stake, it seems to depart from the principle provided in article 53 CFREU which provides that:
'Nothing in this Chapter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised … by Union law and International Law …', including article 11 ECHR. 140 According to Davies, this reflects the fact that the CJEU regards its own role as one of preserving and encouraging the Community's laws fundamental principles which include economic freedoms. The ECtHR should be, and has the potential to be, the 'guardian' of this right. 144 Thus, it essentially acknowledges the right to strike as an essential facet of article 11 ECHR. The shift from the Court's stance in RMT might be explained as a consequence of extra-judicial considerations. Jacobs states that the Convention 'has come into dire straits over the past number of years, and the case law of the ECtHR is no longer the subject of widespread appreciation'. 145 Some decades ago, labour lawyers discouraged their clients from bringing their claim on the right to strike in front of the ECtHR. This is not the case anymore. The Strasbourg Court, regardless of errors, can be perceived as the 'guardian' of human rights, including the right to strike.
F. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to provide a systematic analysis of the right to strike as protected by the ECHR. This analysis is premised on the suggestion that the right to strike constitutes one 
